On October 6, a
massive blast outside Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, Pakistan, claimed the lives of two Chinese nationals working for Port Qasim Electric Power Company (Private) Limited and left at least eight others injured. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist militant group, claimed responsibility for the attack which it described as a “fidayeen” (self-sacrificial) operation targeting a “high-level convoy of Chinese engineers and investors”.
The attack follows a suicide bombing earlier this year that killed
five Chinese workers, which no group has claimed responsibility for. In the past, the BLA has carried out several
attacks across Pakistan, including on the
Gwadar Port, which resulted in high casualties.
Chinese expatriates have unfortunately been
the target of such attacks for a long time now. Even before Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative investments, between 2004 and 2010, Chinese expatriates suffered more terrorist attacks in Pakistan than in any other country.
For its part, Islamabad has undertaken several initiatives to ensure the safety of Chinese citizens, including the creation of a 10,000-strong special security division for the protection of Chinese nationals and assets in Pakistan. However, the intensity of attacks has only increased. Evidently, Islamabad’s measures have yielded limited results.
Persistent attacks against Chinese targets in Pakistan have compelled Beijing to rethink future
aid and investment in the country. Chinese public opinion and the threat of spillover of violent extremism have forced Beijing to think more seriously about the security of its personnel and investments.
Owing to its long-standing principle of non-interference, Beijing has mostly relied on and pressured Islamabad’s military and civilian authorities to protect Chinese interests. In trying to keep out of direct involvement, but also ensure that its interests are protected, Beijing has primarily supported Pakistan in countering terrorism, rather than getting directly involved.
